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1 Why do bad things happen, why is there suffering in the world? The problem of evil
poses a serious threat to the idea of God as an omnipotent, omniscient and absolutely
good  being  since  it  had  been  first  articulated.  The  existence  of  horrible  natural
disasters and moral abominations continues to be one of the strongest arguments for
atheism. Consequently, attempts of absolving God of the charge are legion: theodicies
belong to the essential repertoire of traditional Christian theology and philosophy of
religion.  These attempts have been subject  of  criticism and mockery from the very
beginning, perhaps most prominently and amusingly manifested in Voltaire’s Professor
Pangloss,  who  cannot  help  but  insist  that  “everything  is  best,”  no  matter  the
catastrophes happening around him. 
2 Though the philosophical  refinements  of  Leibniz’  thesis  of  “the best  of  all  possible
worlds” may well be said to be defrauded by Voltaire and his depiction of Pangloss, the
overall charge articulates an intuition well beyond Leibniz’ particular argument: Must
not any attempt of justifying the obvious atrocities of our world lead to cynicism? Isn’t
it actually an inability to take evil seriously, a peculiar, if not to say vicious blindness
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towards suffering? Doesn’t a morally sensitive and engaged standpoint demand for a
determined anti-theodicism?
3 In  Pragmatic  Realism,  Religious  Truth,  and  Antitheodicy,  pragmatist  philosopher  Sami
Pihlström  follows  this  line  of  criticism  and  tackles  the  underlying  metaphysical
presumptions. Pihlström, who already elaborated on the topic of evil, most extensively
in his Taking Evil Seriously (2014), carries forward and deepens his previous work on
pragmatic realism and the question of theodicy in the book at hand, connecting both
issues  adeptly  and  with  general  implications  for  the  still  prevalent  separation  of
theoretical and practical questions in philosophy of religion (and, it may be added, in
academic philosophy at large). Worldviews, whether religious or secular, do not remain
abstract, but have practical and existential relevance. Theory matters, so to speak, and
Pihlström makes  this  original  pragmatist  insight  highly  visible  when he  marks  the
“excessive theorization when it comes to reacting to others’ suffering” (vii) as ethically
problematic. 
4 In the introduction, Pihlström discusses and defends a general account of pragmatism
as an important philosophical approach today. What is more, he outlines its special
promise  in  the  study  of  religion,  drawing  mainly  on  James,  namely  his  pragmatic
pluralism,  but  also on other (neo-)pragmatist  contributions as  well  as  Kant,  who is
presented as a key thinker and a pragmatist  avant  la  lettre.  In short,  the pragmatic
reconceptualization  of  the  ideas  of  rationality,  truth  and  objectivity  as  practice-
embedded opens up a middle path between the major positions of evidentialism and
fideism,  rejecting  both  pseudo-objectivity  and  the  evasion  of  objectivity.  With  this
liberal,  context-sensitive,  practice-focused  version  of  evidentialism,  the  pragmatic
approach also mediates between realism and antirealism. Over and above this promise
for the epistemic battleground, Pihlström argues, the inherent meliorism helps to deal
fruitfully with the existential challenge of living in a world full of evil. 
5 In Chapter 1, Pihlström outlines the conceptual context of the realism vs. antirealism
debate before applying the standard positions to the field of philosophy of religion and
theology. Followingly, the pragmatic rearticulation of realism in terms of practice is
introduced, which seeks to solve the tension between realist and antirealist positions
by way of a reconciliatory move: “the world is (empirically) independent of us, but its
independence  is  itself  a  human  construct  within  our  purposive  practices  and  may
receive different forms within different practices.” (10). The pragmatist position avoids
scientistism  and  reductionist  naturalism  on  the  one  hand  as  well  as  a  full-blown
relativism on the other hand, Pihlström emphasizes. Rather, it leads to a conception of
“objectivity  without  objects”  (15)  that  “lies  in  our  practices  of  engagement  and
commitment  themselves”  (17).  This  transcendental-pragmatic  and  processual
conception  of  objectivity  is  deeply  intertwined  with  the  concepts  of  (Hegelian)
recognition and (Kantian) limit. It is not only the recognition of different persons or
groups that matters, but also the recognition of how (and why) they set their epistemic
boundaries, for example for reason, or scientific evidence. Objectivity, then, becomes
visible as a dynamic process in which different subjects co-construct and co-interpret
common normative standards. The recognition of others as fellow inquirers, Pihlström
claims,  is  fundamental  to  understand  the  pragmatist  core  concept  of  inquiry.
Moreover, from a pragmatist perspective, acts of recognition are based on the idea of
common projects of inquiry in a shared world. 
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6 Chapter 2  further  elaborates  on  the  suggested  pragmatic  realism  that  mediates
between  metaphysical  realist  and  relativist  positions.  After  giving  a  tour  de  force
through  two-and-a-half  millennia  of  the  problem  of  realism  in  seven  milestones,
Pihlström arrives at the “post-Putniam phase,” which demands to go “back to Kant, but
through the classical pragmatists” (34). The second part of the chapter is devoted to
showing one way of integrating Kantian and pragmatist perspectives. Pihlström brings
forward the idea of the “contextuality of scheme (in)dependence,” arguing in the line
of thinkers who advocate the “dependence thesis” against metaphysical realism, that is
against  the  idea  of  a  world  an  sich. Whereas  the  distinction  between  scheme-
independent and scheme-dependent entities can be maintained, Pihlström suggests, it
has  to  be  continuously  redescribed  and  contextualized.  There  is  nothing  non-
contextual to refer to in this world-constituting activity, which makes the process not
only  indefinite,  but  also  circular.  Yet  this  very  circularity,  Pihlström  maintains,
prevents  his  “pragmatic,  naturalized  version  of  transcendental  idealism  from
collapsing into a full-blown metaphysical idealism” (38).  Though this version knows
only  relative  a  prioris  and  no  universal  structures,  a  “touch  of  Kantian
transcendentality” remains, since “it is only within a given context that we are so much
as  able  to  experience  or  categorize  reality  in  any  meaningful  matter”  (39).  These
contexts,  however,  are  themselves  practice-embedded  and  thus  subject  to  change,
without  a  super-perspective  or  super-practice  to  judge  them.  Following  Putnam,
Pihlström points to the role of values in our dealings with the world. Its entanglement
with facts does not allow for a “clean” distinction and shapes contextual schemes. That,
Pihlström concludes, amounts to a conditional necessity, a pragmatic transcendental:
“Without a valuational context,  there could be no things – and no facts – at all  for
us.” (43).
7 In Chapter 3 Pihlström explicates the connection between metaphysical realism and
theodicism, problematizing it on “pragmatist-cum-Kantian grounds.” Kantian critical
philosophy, Pihlström argues, is  a background of the “pragmatist protest” (48),  and
pragmatist,  especially  Jamesian,  philosophy  of  religion  further  develops  and
reinterprets  Kant’s  postulates  of  practical  reason.  This  becomes  apparent  in  the
criticism  of  theodicies,  both  Kantian  and  pragmatist,  which  is  neatly  examined  by
Pihlström in what follows. The primacy of ethics to metaphysics leads, in short, to the
demand of acknowledging the reality of evil as a necessary, even transcendental
condition of an ethically meaningful life,  including any religious meaning. Engaging
Richard  Rorty’s  reflections  on  Orwell’s  1984,  Pihlström  furthermore  points  to  the
“fragility  of  antitheodicy”  and  the moral  point  of  view  in  general  (60):  a  minimal
understanding of truth must be maintained in order to keep the possibility of sincerity.
We need to contrast reality “with something like unreality,” truth and truthfulness
“with falsity but also with lying and self-deception” (60) as a precondition of not only
antitheodicism but of an ethical stance at all.
8 Therefore, the value of (objective) truth and truthfulness has to be defended. This is
one  of  the  objectives  of  Chapter  4,  which  addresses  religious  pluralism  and  its
connection to the question of truth. Religious exclusivism, Pihlström argues, rests on
metaphysical realism, a realism that comes with a “non-human – theocentric – pursuit
of objectivity” (65). In a religious diverse society, in which questions of recognition are
a crucial and at the same time delicate issue, “a sound version of religious inclusivism”
(65) may be highly relevant and helpful with regard to responding to the challenge of
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otherness. Jamesian pragmatic truth is conceptually tied with truthfulness as well as
acknowledgment: “One cannot really pursue truth in the Jamesian sense unless one
acknowledges,  or  at  least  truthfully  seeks  to  acknowledge,  others’  perspectives  on
reality  –  especially  those  structured  by  suffering.”  (69).  Metaphysical  realism,  as
Pihlström  shows  in  the  remaining  part  of  the  chapter,  fails  to  acknowledge  the
perspectival plurality and diversity of others’ suffering. This ethical criticism aims at
realism  and  “its  (typical)  consequence,  theodicism,”  which  “will  then  ultimately
collapse hand in hand” (75).  The basic  problem, according to Pihlström, lies  in the
“essentially detached view” (78) that metaphysical realism proposes, and its tendency
to reductive objectification with regard to God, others’s suffering, and otherness itself,
which must not be objectified. However, the failure to acknowledge the irreducibility of
otherness  is  a  tendency  in  ourselves which  has  to  be  reflected  on  and  criticized,
Pihlström remarks, so that the “moral criticism of theodicism (and realism) ought to be
primarily self-criticism, a criticism of our temptation to theodicy” (83). 
9 With  Wittgenstein  and  other  philosophers  of  religion  in  this  tradition,  another
approach to  rejecting  theodicism is  employed in  Chapter 5.  D.Z. Phillips  and others
have suggested that theodicies are confused ethically as well as conceptually. Due to
their  insensitive  and  pseudo-religious  use  of  language,  they  would  amount  to
blasphemy. Pihlström turns to the early Wittgenstein in order to further elaborate on a
Wittgensteinian  antitheodicism  which  usually  focuses  on  the  later  works.  After
examining the role of harmony and happiness and their relation, especially referring to
the Notebooks 1914-1916 and the Tractatus, Pihlström points out how evil and suffering
lead to a fundamental disharmony that has to be acknowledged though “Live happily!”
is  the  highest  moral  command,  leading to  a  transcendental,  rather  than empirical,
happiness. This happiness cannot be found in the world (nor outside of it). Actually, it is
a  kind  of  “meta-level  harmony  or  happiness”  (99)  that  never  really  gets  rid  of
disharmonious spots caused by the suffering of others – or at least, Pilström reminds
the reader, should not get rid of if it is not to collapse into a theodicist harmonious
total worldview. Then, Pihlström provides a closer look at the Wittgensteinian idea of
the limits of language and its use in the philosophy of religion, arguing against the
common charge of “Wittgensteinian fideism,” or an “easy language-game relativism”
(108).  Rather,  Pihlström defends his Kantian transcendental reading of Wittgenstein
that allows for religion and ethics to provide a fundamental framework, a structure for
the empirical world, being itself not part of it but “at the limit.” Yet this is not to “set
up any metaphysical barrier between our language games and the reality in which we
live and act and use language” (108). Rather, language (and its limits) depends on our
forms  of  lives,  and  it  is  changeable.  This  leads  to  the  idea  of  the  contingency  of
necessity:  “Clearly,  when  we  are  engaged  in  a  certain  language  game,  the  rules
governing our operations within that game are necessary, but whenever we take a step
out  of  the  game,  we  realize  that  our  playing  the  game  in  the  first  place  is  itself
contingent.” (111).
10 That is to say that the problem of evil itself is historically contingent and mutable, and
so  are  the  (philosophical)  responses  to  it.  In  Chapter 6,  Pihlström  first  marks  the
existential  dimension of the problem of evil  as specifically modern, in contrast,  for
example, to the “scholastics’ problem of securing the coherence of Christian theism”
(119).  That  we  live  –  and  think  –  after  the  Holocaust,  is  crucial  to  our  present
situational context. It is in the face of this situation, that our philosophical dealings
with suffering have to be judged. As an outstanding example of addressing evil without
Review of Sami Pihlströhm, Pragmatic Realism, Religious Truth, and Antitheodi...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
4
giving any meaning to it,  that is,  without rendering the inflicted harms justified or
acceptable, Pihlström draws to Primo Levi’s writings. Levi, Pihlström observes, “argues
against  a  certain  morally  reprehensible  practice  of  theodicism  manifested  by  even
merely theoretical commitment to a theodicy” (127). A principled dichotomy between
theory and practice cannot be drawn,  and the refusal  to  do so is  at  the ground of
pragmatic antitheodicsm. Yet, as Pihlström concedes, the philosophical defense of that
antitheodicism  “may  itself  be  detached  from  the  recognizing  practice  it  seeks  to
defend,” doing “little to practically alleviate any meaningless suffering actually taking
place in the world” (131). Even more, it bears on being in the privileged position of
taking  a  theoretical  stance  towards  the  concrete  evil  –  a  fact  philosophers  should
include in their reflections.
11 In  his  concluding  remarks,  Pihlström  drives  the  demand to  resist  any  attempts  of
giving meaning even further and extends it to goodness. The pursuit of meaningfulness
may be transversal to morality if it seeks to create meaning by good deeds and thereby
instrumentalizes our actions. Ultimate meaningfulness, thus, has to be rejected in any
form. Instead, it remains an ongoing existential task to live meaningful lives without
any grand narratives,  religious or otherwise – and a philosophical  task to critically
reflect on these attempts, including self-reflection. 
12 Pihlström’s well-written book is a major contribution to that very task. It offers not
only a careful  examination of  the problem of  evil  and thereby adds to a particular
debate in the philosophy of religion, but aims at a fundamental change of perspective
with  regard  to  its  grounds.  With  analyzing  the  connection  between  metaphysical
realism and theodicism, Pihlström convincingly reveals the problematic preconditions
of theodicism. At the same time, the (practical)  relevance of metaphysical premises
becomes  apparent.  Considering  other  classical  metaphysical  problems  with  the
suggested  Kantian-pragmatist  “tools”  seems  to  be  a  promising  challenge.  However,
Philström  takes  pragmatic  pluralism  seriously  and  does  not  advocate  a  single
philosophical approach as universal remedy. On the methodological level, he seeks to
show how pragmatism and the theory of  recognition could be fruitfully  connected.
Furthermore, with employing Wittgenstein and Levi,  diverse roads to antitheodicsm
are illustrated,  also pointing out  the relevance of  other-than-philosophical  dealings
with suffering. 
13 What is more, the pluralist stance manifests on the performative level, that is, in the
manner of philosophizing itself. Though Pihlström holds undeniably strong positions,
he constantly and unapologetically reflects on the limits of the proposed perspectives.
Being fully  aware of  the  existential  relevance of  metaphysical  beliefs,  this  includes
pointing  out  the  challenge  of  living  in  the  face  of  the  “constant  possibility  of
meaninglessness”  (86).  The  humanism  of  antitheodicism  comes  not  only  with
conceptual tensions that have to be addressed. It also needs to be articulated as a viable
worldview, that is, a worldview that meets its own demands of enabling an ethical life. 
14 Beyond discussing objections and caveats, Pihlström thematizes his very own situation
as a thinker, unfolding the contextuality of (philosophical) theorizing performatively.
Whereas  underlining  the  importance  of  self-examination  is  a  common  move  in
philosophical  statements,  the critical  impetus all  too often stops at  the doorstep of
one’s  own  position.  Pihlström  incorporates  self-criticism  in  his  overall  project  of
defending a moral point of view. The book, thus, is not only of interest for philosophers
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of  religion  or  those  interested  in  pragmatist  research.  It  is  an  example  of  how
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